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A LOOKING GLASS TOUR THROUGH A COST
SHARING ARRANGEMENT
Sheila J. Peterson
INTRODUCTION
Over the years, underdeveloped countries have expressed the
desire to have U.S. businesses move into their country. To entice
U.S. companies to expand overseas, countries may offer a combina-
tion of tax and economic incentives, possibly including a tax holiday
for a specified period;1 non-repayable loans for purchase of fixed
assets, training of the work force, research activities;2 accelerated
depreciation on fixed assets;3 and a variety of tax credits.4 Even
small manufacturing concerns may consider these attractive rea-
sons to risk overseas expansion.5
Once the decision is made to expand overseas, the company
must consider whether to operate the foreign activity as a separate
business entity or as a division of the existing corporation. The cor-
poration must consider which product or product line (existing or
newly developed) could be efficiently manufactured overseas, and
the means for setting up the manufacturing process. This process
may require not only the transfer of tangible property like test
equipment, computers, etc., but will also require the transfer of the
invention or design that is to be manufactured. This transfer of an
invention, formula, process, design, etc. is considered the transfer of
an intangible6 and if transferred to a separate corporation, is a taxa-
1. Hsu & Wang Ho, Business Operations in the Republic of China (Taiwan), 328-2nd
Tax Mgmt. (BNA) A-23.
2. Murray, Business Operations in the Republic of Ireland, 125-3rd Tax Mgmt. (BNA)
A-3.
3. 328-2nd Tax Mgmt., supra note 1.
4. Id.
5. At a minimum, the company risks losing hands-on control over all the operations.
Also, an unstable political environment could certainly spell disaster to a small company even
with all the tax and economic incentives.
6. I.R.C. § 936(h)(3)(B) (1986) defines an intangible to include:
(i) patent, invention, formula, process, design, pattern or knowhow;
(ii) copyright, literary, musical, or artistic composition;
(iii) trademark, trade name, or brand name;
(iv) franchise, license, or contract;
(v) method, program, system, procedure, campaign, survey, study, forecast, estimate, cus-
tomer list, or technical data; or
(vi) any similar item,
which has substantial value independent of the services of any individual.
1989]
COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 5
ble event.7,8
There are several alternatives available for the transfer of an
intangible to another corporation. Generally, the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) is not concerned about the form or the price, because
unrelated parties will bargain in their own best interest, and an
arm's length price will necessarily result.9
However, there is a great deal of concern over a transfer of
property between related parties, as intercompany transactions may
not be sufficiently arm's length. The parties' common goal may be
to pay the least amount of combined tax on the transaction, specifi-
cally contrary to the IRS' determination of U.S. tax liability.
Internal Revenue Code § 48210 provides the IRS with a mecha-
nism for income reallocation on the transfer of property between
related parties. A transfer to the foreign subsidiary in the form of a
sale or license is subject to reallocation under § 482; " if in the form
of a taxable capital contribution to the related party, the transfer
will be subject to reallocation under the special rules of
§ 367(d)(2).1 2
7. I.R.C. § 1001(a) (1986).
8. The discussion here involves solely the income tax consequences of such a transfer.
There may be, inter alia, sales tax, customs tax and property tax consequences which will not
be discussed here.
9. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 100 (5th ed. 1979) defines as follows: Arm's length
transaction: "Said of a transaction negotiated by unrelated parties, each acting in his or her
own self interest; the basis for a fair market value determination."
10. Hereinafter referred to as I.R.C.§ or merely §. Unless otherwise stated, all refer-
ences are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, and the regulations promulgated thereunder.
11. I.R.C. § 482 (1986) reads as follows:
In any case of 2 or more.. .businesses.. .owind or controlled.. .by the same
interests, the Secretary may.. .allocate gross income,[or] deductions.. .if he de-
termines that such. . .allocation is necessary in order to prevent evasion of
taxes or clearly to reflect the income.. .orsuch.. .businesses. In the case of any
transfer (or license) of intangible property (within the meaning of
§ 936(h)(3)(B)), the income with respect to such transfer or license shall be com-
mensurate with the income attributable to the intangible. (emphasis added).
12. I.R.C. § 367(d) (1986) reads as follows:
Special rules Relating to Transfers of Intangibles -
(1) General Rule: Except as provided in Regulations, if a US person trans-
fers any intangible property (within the meaning of § 936(h)(3)(b)) to a foreign
corporation in an exchange described in § 351, (a) subsection (a) shall not ap-
ply to the transfer. . .[and](b) the provisions of this subsection shall apply...
(2) In general, if paragraph (1) applies, the US person transferring such prop-
erty shall be treated as (i) having sold such property in exchange for payments
which are contingent upon the productivity, (or) use... of such property and
(ii) receiving amounts which reasonably reflect the amounts which would have
been received
(I) Annually over the useful life, or
(II) at the time of the disposition.
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These reallocation provisions have become even more signifi-
cant 'with the introduction of the "super-royalty" provisions of the
Tax Reform Act of 1986.13 Substantially similar amendments to
three code sections (§§ 482, 367(d) and 936) introduced an almost
revolutionary concept into the tax law. These super-royalty provi-
sions are based on an eight-word phrase which requires that the
income recognized on the transfer of an intangible be "commensu-
rate with the income attributable to the intangible."14 That is, the
income relating to the intangible developed by the party (or parties)
will be recognized by the parties.15 This wording appears to alter
the historic arm's length standard 16 of prospectively assessing the
value of the property on the transfer of intangibles between related
parties, and introduces an additional "hindsight" or "look-back"
approach. 17 The essence of this change is that the IRS can, on au-
dit, review the profitability of the intangible and reset the sales price
or royalty rate (hence, the super-royalty) to reflect actual experi-
ence, something the parties could not have known at the time of
entering into the agreement.' 8 This may be a rather frightening un-
certainty for a company that participates in sophisticated tax plan-
ning, and one they would certainly want to avoid.
One way to avoid the super-royalty provisions is to make no
transfer, while still allowing the related party access to the intangi-
ble. 9 While the sharing of one's managerial expertise and experi-
The amounts taken into account under clause (ii) shall be commensurate with
the income attributable to the intangible.
13. The Tax Reform Act of 1986, § 1231(e)(1), Pub. L. No. 99-514, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1986). The Act is effective for tax years beginning after Dec. 31, 1986. It applies to
outbound transfers after Nov. 16, 1985, and inbound transfers after Aug. 16, 1986.
14. I.R.C. § 482 (1986).
15. There may be difficulty in delineating what portion of the income is attributable to
the intangible and what portion is attributable to other factors, e.g. marketing efforts, good-
will associated with the company name or logo, past experience with the company through a
related product, etc.
16. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 9.
17. This type of a provision may have been included in an agreement between unrelated
parties, but is certainly not a required provision in every arm's length agreement.
18. The look-back approach seems contrary to the way business is actually transacted
in that it alleviates any risk-taking regarding future profitability. Foreign taxing jurisdictions
may not allow deductions for the look-back approach which may be contrary to the negoti-
ated terms of the agreement. See comments by Christoph Bellstedt, international tax adviser
in W. Germany. Mr. Bellstedt believes that Germany would not allow a downward adjust-
ment to the income of a related party licensee following a "super-royalty" adjustment to the
U.S. parent. See 41 Tax Notes No. 12, 1273-74 (Dec. 19, 1988).
19. The opposing view is that cost sharing is an IRS "favor" to taxpayers. The technol-
ogy is going out at less than fair market value and will be tolerated only because the costs
shared are based on an objective standard. This position negates dual or multiple ownership
of the intangible.
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ence has been held to be a transfer of technology,20 it is not a
transfer if both parties jointly own the intangible. Joint ownership
from inception can be achieved through the use of a Bona Fide Cost
Sharing Arrangement (hereinafter, a BFCSA). Much like a joint
venture between unrelated parties, a BFCSA is a written agreement
between related parties to share the costs and risks of the research
and development (R & D) in return for a specified interest in the
future intangible.2 1 The conference report on the super-royalty pro-
visions indicates that BFCSAs are still an appropriate method of
allocating income as long as "consistent with the purposes of this
provision.""
The following example will illustrate the effects of the super-
royalty provisions. The IRS conducts an audit three years after a
U.S. company transfers its technology and sets up a royalty agree-
ment with its foreign subsidiary. The agreement provides for a roy-
alty of twenty dollars per unit to be paid to the U.S. company, with
a declining rate for sales over a particular quantity per period (say
fifteen dollars for sales over 1,000 for the quarter). The IRS reviews
the worldwide profits generated by the new technology and adjusts
the royalty rate payable to the U.S. developer to thirty dollars per
unit. This amount may be far in excess of the amount the parties
contemplated in their original negotiations.23
This comment reviews the historical development of BFCSAs
and the Congressional concerns in allowing for their continued use.
The comment develops the issues and mechanics one need consider
in setting up a BFCSA from the idea stage through completion of
the product. Further, the comment analyzes four sets of materials
on cost sharing: the proposed regulations which were never en-
acted, but serve to enlighten the reader as to qualifying require-
ments; the final regulations which were enacted, but which are so
vague as to provide little guidance to the taxpayer; the § 482 White
Paper "Discussion Draft" issued by the IRS in October, 1988,24
20. Hospital Corp. ofAmerica and Subsidiaries v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 81 T.C.
520 (1983).
21. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(d)(4) (1968). It is unclear what "risks" are being shared
other than costs. Risks may conceivably indicate factors such as lost time, loss of market
position, and labor which could be diverted to other ideas. Risks may also include uncer-
tainty as to the product's ultimate performance, market acceptance and efficiency of the man-
ufacturing process.
22. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-638 (1986).
23. § 482 adjustments are tools of the Secretary of the Treasury (i.e., the IRS), not the
taxpayer. Presumably, no adjustments will be made if the profitability is less than was origi-
nally anticipated in the arm's length negotiation.
24. § 482 White Paper On Intercompany Pricing, 75 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) No.
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with a view toward collecting information and eventually proposing
new regulations; z" and a draft of comments by the American Bar
Association (ABA) suggesting revisions prior to proposing new
regulations.
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The § 482 reallocation provisions have been around for many
years. 26 BFCSAs were a noted exception to these provisions under
proposed regulations issued in 196627 which provided detailed rules
with respect to BFCSAs. The proposed regulations gave the district
director the right to reallocate the costs of the R & D; discussed the
required method for sharing the costs and risks of development;
provided rules for measurement of a participating member's full
share of the costs and risks of development; and covered some of
the agreement terms. 28
In 1968, cost sharing regulations were adopted in a truncated29
version from that discussed above. About one-eighth the size of the
proposed regulations, the final regulations were short, simple, and
rather vague. They included a definition of BFCSAs, a definition of
good faith, a transitional rule, and a statement of the district direc-
tor's power to reallocate to an arm's length share of the costs and
risks.30 None of the includible costs, full shares, required methods,
or agreement terms and conditions within the proposed regulations
were mentioned.
Information on foreign treatment of cost sharing arrangements
is sparse. Cost sharing arrangements are discussed favorably in a
report prepared by the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation
and Development (OECD). The report entitled Transfer Pricing
and Multinational Enterprises indicates that "[e]xperience with such
intra-group cost sharing arrangements is said to be positive and
*they do not appear to have opened up avenues for tax avoidance."3
53 (Oct. 20, 1988) [hereinafter White Paper]. This is a study prepared by the Treasury De-
partment regarding intercompany pricing in conjunction with the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
25. Pursuant to comments by D. Lilly, Professor of Law, Santa Clara University, no
proposed regulations are expected any time soon, but it is expected that "lines will be drawn"
in the proposed regulations.
26. The origins of § 482 can be traced to Articles 77 and 78 of Rep. 41 (1921) with
respect to the filing of consolidated returns. 230-3rd (US) Tax Mgmt. (BNA) A-1.
27. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(d)(4), 31 Fed. Reg. 10394 (1966).
28. Id.
29. J. Fuller, International Tax Aspects of the Transfer or Use of Intangibles, Meeting
of the CBEMA Chief Tax Executives Council 43 (January 22, 1987).
30. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(d)(4) (1968).
31. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Report of the Commit-
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The OECD report details the U.S. treatment of cost sharing ar-
rangements, but indicates that "[o]ther countries contributing to the
preparation of this report had little experience [with]... cost shar-
ing arrangements on the lines of those approved by the United
States regulations" and indicate that the other countries "have not
felt the need to draft special rules regarding the deductibility of
such [cost sharing] payments....
Although the German tax agents "Handbook" does not take a
position as to whether contributions to a "research pool" may be
made by German subsidiaries to foreign parent companies "[t]here
have been at least a few cases in which the tax authorities allowed
sizeable German subsidiaries to participate in research and develop-
ment pools. . .,. In France, although "[tlhe French tax adminis-
tration does not have special rules applicable to cost sharing
arrangements," the arrangement may be subject to value added tax
(V.A.T.) and a source withholding tax may apply to the
payments. 34
The § 482 White Paper also reflects the lack of information
available to the IRS and requests information from the taxpayer.
"In view of the limited information currently available on both re-
lated and unrelated cost sharing agreements, the Service and Treas-
ury would appreciate receiving information from taxpayers
regarding their contractual arrangements and experience with cost
sharing.'"35
CONGRESSIONAL CONCERNS ON COST SHARING
BFCSAs appear well-received in the Committee Reports under
§ 482 of the 1986 Tax Reform Act, and the conferees seem amena-
ble to their continuation. The conferees stated, "[i]n revising § 482,
the conferees do not intend to preclude the use of certain bona fide
research and development cost-sharing arrangements as an appro-
priate method of allocating income attributable to intangibles
among related parties..." 3
tee on Fiscal Affairs, Transfer Pricing and Multinational Enterprises 55-62 (1979) [hereinafter
OECD, Transfer Pricing and Multinational Enterprises].
32. OECD, Transfer Pricing and Multinational Enterprises, at 58.
33. Strobl, Germany: German Tax Audits of Foreign Subsidiaries in Germany - Practice
and Experience, 80-9 TAX MGMT. INT'L J. 28, 31 (1980).
34. Societe de Conseils D'Entreprises, Paris, France: Transfer Pricing Within Multina-
tional Enterprises and Article 57 of the French General Tax Code, 80-4 TAX MGMT. INT'L J.
9, 11 (1980).
35. White Paper, supra note 25, at 109.
36. H.R. CONF. REF. No. 841, supra note 23, at 11-638.
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However, the Conferees added a limitation to the use of BFC-
SAs by continuing the above sentence as follows: "....[i]f and to the
extent such agreements are consistent with the purposes of this pro-
vision that the income allocated among the parties reasonably re-
flect the actual economic activity undertaken by each.""a This
limitation appears to reflect an intent that the super-royalty provi-
sions apply to cost sharing arrangements in some form.
The White Paper breaks out the text of the committee report
into three specific areas of Congressional concern. These areas are
significant issues in the cost sharing arena and include selective in-
clusion of high profit intangibles, the basis for contributions to the
BFCSA and the buy-in of currently existing intangibles. Although
these topics may fall within a subheading of a larger category in the
accompanying text, the issue itself could make or break the corpo-
ration's ability to use cost sharing effectively. Each of these three
items will be discussed separately below.
SETTING UP YOUR BONA FIDE COST SHARING ARRANGEMENT
Product Coverage
In setting up a BFCSA, the first consideration should be the
products or projects that will be covered by the arrangement.3" A
specific category of Congressional concern, the White Paper cau-
tions the taxpayer on "selective inclusion", also known as "cherry-
picking."39 It is inappropriate for a taxpayer to share costs with
their foreign manufacturer only on what is expected to be a highly
profitable product. Cost sharing on a highly profitable product
would reduce expenses of a U.S. developer by an amount equal to
the participants' share of the costs. This is presumably much less
than the amount that would have been recognized as royalty in-
come on the licensing of that same product. The White Paper con-
cern is derived from the following wording in the committee
reports:
Under such a bona fide cost-sharing arrangement, the cost sharer
would be expected to bear its portion of all research and develop-
37. Id.
38. The White Paper deals exclusively with manufacturing intangibles like patents,
trade secrets and know-how, and makes it clear that marketing intangibles are not the proper
subject of a cost sharing arrangement as they would be covered by the service regulations of
Regs. 1.482-2(b)(2). Pursuant to comments by D. Lilly, Professor of Law at Santa Clara
University, an in-depth worldwide market research study may be the appropriate subject of a
BFCSA.
39. Fuller, Other International Changes, 83 TAXEs INT'L 77, 78 (1986).
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ment costs, on unsuccessful as well as successful products within
an appropriate product area, and the costs of research and devel-
opment at all relevant development stages would be included.
(emphasis added).4°
The § 482 White Paper finds the "appropriate product area"
discussed in the Conference report would be the three-digit Stan-
dard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes.41 These codes generally
define products across rather broad product lines. For example, a
manufacturer of chemicals and allied products would fall under
Code 2830 for all its manufactured drug products, and under Code
2850 for its painting products. Likewise, an electronics manufac-
turer, would fall under Code 3670 for the manufacture of its elec-
tronic components and accessories (e.g. integrated circuits, power
supplies, and transformers) and under Code 3698 for all other elec-
trical equipment (presumably, all its computers and test
equipment).4 2
This approach seems to include a broad spectrum of R & D
products within a cost sharing arrangement. The White Paper spe-
cifically notes that this approach is at odds with the 1966 proposed
regulations: "The approach in... the... legislative history [of the
1986 Act] contrasts to the proposed 1966 regulations. Cost sharing
arrangements described in the 1966 proposed regulations could
cover a single project, although multi-project or product area cost
sharing agreements were not prohibited."4
Even though this seems to be a strict requirement of product
grouping, the IRS states that "[b]oth the Service or the taxpayer
should be permitted to demonstrate... that a narrower or broader
agreement is more appropriate."'  The White Paper then proceeds
with a discussion of the proof requirements:
Taxpayers choosing a narrower agreement would need to show
that the agreement is not merely an attempt to shift profits from
successful research areas while leaving expenses of unsuccessful or
less successful areas to be absorbed by the US. or higher tax affili-
ate... [T]axpayers choosing a broader agreement would need to
40. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 841, supra note 23, at 11-638.
41. These codes are used by the IRS in various places (see instructions for Form 5471 at
12). They are designed to facilitate the administration of the Internal Revenue Code by clas-
sifying enterprises by the type of activity in which they are engaged. Though similar in format
and structure to the Standard Industrial Classification codes, they should not be used as SIC
codes.
42. This is the same classification used under § 936(h) for cost sharing with possessions
corporations.
43. White Paper, supra note 25, at 115.
44. Id. at 116.
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show that the agreement is not being used to charge US. affiliates
or other participants for research and development without rea-
sonable prospect of benefit. (emphasis added)45
Therefore, a "narrower agreement" requires the U.S. taxpayer
to meet a higher standard of proof. It would likely be invoked
where the U.S. taxpayer has one highly profitable intangible devel-
oped under a BFCSA with their foreign subsidiary, and several
other low profit intangibles which are not covered by a BFCSA.
This higher standard of proof requirement results in a correspond-
ing lower standard of proof to the IRS with respect to technology
developed in the U.S. Likewise the "broader agreement" proof will
require a higher standard where a foreign developer shares costs on
all, or substantially all, of its products and the U.S. partner partici-
pates in all costs. 46
The American Bar Association (ABA) has prepared a draft of
proposed revisions for the Service on the substance of the White
Paper. The ABA comment suggests a need for more flexibility than
strict SIC product code coverage for cost sharing arrangements:
We believe the focus should be on benefit or reasonably expected
benefit, and that more flexibility needs to be introduced into the
rules governing product coverage. This could be along the lines of
the 1966 proposed regulations approach to product or project
coverage, but in any event, it should be without the special bur-
dens of proof discussed in the White Paper. If the taxpayer can
establish a reasonably anticipated commensurate benefit, that
alone should satisfy the taxpayer's burden of proof without the
need for additional product coverage restrictions. (emphasis
added).47
Participating Parties
Even though the § 482 White Paper appears to require equal
treatment for all R & D projects under a specific SIC product code,
exclusion of a participant from a BFCSA on particular product may
still be appropriate depending on the functions of the participants.
The White Paper's discussion of "Overly Broad Agreements" sug-
gests that inclusion is required only if the participants plan to man-
ufacture the product. The White Paper describes a manufacturer of
45. White Paper, supra note 25, at 116.
46. The committee reports of the 1986 Tax Reform Act indicate that both outbound
transfers and inbound transfers are specifically covered by the super-royalty provisions. H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 841,supranote 34.
47. J. Fuller & R. Shea, The White Paper's Cost Sharing Proposals 3 (Jan. 16, 1989)
(draft of comments prepared by the ABA).
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widgets and gadgets who enters into a BFCSA with its affiliate A
that manufactures only gadgets, and suggests that cost sharing be-
tween the manufacturer and affiliate A is only appropriate for the
gadget research. "It may be necessary ... either to have separate
cost sharing agreements for widget and gadget research, to adjust
affiliate A's cost share to reflect the costs related to gadget research,
or to exclude affiliate A from the cost sharing arrangement. '48
This example runs contrary to the previously discussed stan-
dard of product code cost sharing. The ABA comment agrees with
the use of a benefit test "[i]f the affiliate does not stand to benefit
from the overall or widget research, then clearly under a benefit test
it should not be included in the cost sharing applicable to wid-
gets."'4 9 However, the ABA comment states that "[i]n a given set of
facts, the affiliate which manufactures only gadgets may nonetheless
benefit from widget research,"50 and again finds the White Paper
standard to be lacking in the necessary flexibility required from a set
of cost sharing rules.
In addition to having plans that the participant manufacture,
the participant must have the capability of manufacture. This re-
quirement is described within the White Paper section entitled "Di-
rect exploitation of intangibles by participants". The IRS finds,
generally, that the benefit being derived by a participant in a
BFCSA is the right to manufacture the intangible. Though the ca-
pability to manufacture need not necessarily be present at the time
the costs are actually incurred, the White Paper indicates that the
parties must anticipate that the participants "will be capable of
manufacture once the intangibles are developed and will use the in-
tangibles developed.. .in the manufacture of products.""1
It is unclear why the IRS is setting the general rule that the
participant must be able to manufacture to participate in a BFCSA.
Aside from manufacture, it seems that a participant might benefit
from new products in many other ways. As the ABA comment
indicates, the manufacturing requirement will eliminate cost shar-
ing for engineering and other service businesses. 52
A threshold consideration before entering into a BFCSA in-
volves a preliminary decision regarding where the product will be
manufactured and an evaluation of the risk that the parties will
48. White Paper, supra note 25, at 118.
49. J. Fuller & R. Shea, supra note 46, at 10.
50. Id.
51. White Paper, supra note 25, at 118-119.
52. J. Fuller & R. Shea, supra note 46, at 11.
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eventually decide NOT to manufacture or sell out of the partici-
pant's facility. Presumably, as long as the participating corporation
has the plans and the capability of manufacture on completion of
the intangible, the BFCSA will still be valid. However, corporate
plans to manufacture at a designated site several years into the fu-
ture may be relatively unstable. From a tax planning standpoint,
cost sharing with a manufacturing subsidiary in a low tax or tax
haven country may provide a deduction to the foreign manufacturer
without tax benefit (i.e. no tax is paid on manufacturing income). A
subsequent transfer from the BFCSA to the 'new" manufacturing
site will require an arm's length payment at fair market value and
there will be taxable royalties (generally taxable even in a tax haven
country) on the transfer.
Includible Costs
BFCSA stands for Bona Fide Cost Sharing Arrangement, and
bona fide is defined to be "made in good faith."53 The final regula-
tions state that the arrangement "must reflect an effort in good faith
by the participating members to bear their respective shares of all
costs and risks of development on an arm's length basis."54
Preliminarily, the participants should consider which costs will
be shared through inclusion in the R & D pool. The 1966 proposed
regulations required that shared costs include "all the direct and
indirect costs actually incurred by the parties to the agreement;15 5
an amount allocable for services rendered by a non-participant
member of the controlled group;56 and an arm's length considera-
tion for the use of other intangible property made available to the
BFCSA 7.5  Each of these three items will be addressed separately
below.
Direct & Indirect Costs
Direct costs would include expenses for salaries,5" research
53. WEBSTER's NEW COLLEGIATE DIcTIONARY 125 (5th ed. 1977).
54. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(d)(4) (1968).
55. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2 (d)(4)(iii)(a)(1), 31 Fed. Reg. 10394 (1966).
56. Id. § 1.482-2(d)(4)(iii)(a)(2).
57. Id. § 1.482-2(d)(4)(iii)(a)(3).
58. Presumably, this could mean all salaries paid the employees working directly on the
R & D for whatever purpose. It is unclear whether additional wages based on the "stock
spread" (FMV of the non-qualified stock options at the date of exercise less the option price)
should be included in the allowable costs. The parties may wish to specifically exclude the
income spread within the agreement. Arguments for exclusion: 1) The stock option exercise
spread in NOT an expense for Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), rather it
is treated as an equity offset; 2) Costs contingent on widely fluctuating stock prices would not
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materials, supplies, and rent on the facilities. Direct costs should
also include an allowance for depreciation limited to the amount
allowed for U.S. purposes.59 Indirect costs would generally include
general and administrative overhead and a charge for support staff.
The White Paper specifically requires indirect costs to include an
allocation for "corporate management expense and overall interest
expense."'  The ABA comment suggests that this allocation re-
quirement is "far more broad that the 1966 proposed regulations
requirement"61 and finds it "inappropriate to include overall inter-
est expense"'62 in the R & D pool.
Services of a Non-Participant
Under the proposed regulations, costs shared by the group
should include an amount for services rendered by a non-partici-
pant member of the controlled group. This was not discussed in the
White Paper or in the ABA comments. Presumably, it would be
considered to be a direct cost attributed to the BFCSA in an
amount based on arms-length consideration.
Buy-Ins
The final cost item discussed in the proposed regulations has
come to be known as the buy-in, and is a significant issue surround-
ing cost sharing after the 1986 Tax Reform Act. Buy-ins are a spe-
cific category of Congressional concern discussed in the cost sharing
provisions of the § 482 White Paper. Since BFCSAs are designed to
allow for participation in the development stage, any product that is
already partially or fully developed when the agreement is entered
into cannot be covered by the cost sharing agreement. Frequently,
however, an existing product is the necessary impetus for a techno-
logical advancement, the necessary first step. If the existing prod-
uct cannot be cost shared, it must be sold or licensed to the group at
an arm's length consideration. The Committee Report states:
To the extent... that one party is actually contributing funds to-
be included in an arm's length agreement as they can not be budgeted, could not be approved
in advance, and bear no relation to the expected benefits from the underlying research; and
(3) The spread may have developed over a long period when the R & D project was not in
existence.
Arguments for inclusion: (1) The spread is included on the employee's W-2 from the
company; and (2) The company gets a tax deduction for the spread.
59. White Paper, supra note 25, at 120.
60. Id.
61. J. Fuller & R. Shea, supra note 46, at 16.
62. Id.
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ward research and development at a significantly earlier point in
time.... or is otherwise effectively putting its funds at risk to a
greater extent than the other, it would be expected that an appro-
priate return would be required to such party to reflect its invest-
ment. (emphasis added).63
This is the buy-in situation. Under the 1966 proposed regulations,
it was stated in simpler terminology requiring sharing of costs
which included:
.. an amount equal to the arm's length value of the use of any
intangible property of a party to the agreement which is made
available by it for use in connection with the activities under-
taken pursuant to the arrangement and which is likely to contrib-
ute to a substantial extent in the production of intangible
property.64
A simple example may make the buy-in issue easier to follow.
If Corporation A had made a technological breakthrough on E-wid-
gets, and had now decided to enter into a BFCSA with its affiliate
Corporation F (a wholly-owned foreign corporation) to make super-
E-widgets, the only costs which could be shared would be those
incurred after the commencement of the BFCSA. Corporation A
would sell or license the E-widget design to the BFCSA at its fair
market value, the BFCSA would "buy-in" to the E-widget
technology.
The § 482 White Paper goes beyond the discussion in the pro-
posed regulations and specifically defines three situations requiring
a buy-in:
A participant may own preexisting intangibles at various stages of
development that will become subject to the arrangement. A
company may also conduct basic research not associated with any
product. Finally, there may be a going concern value associated
with a participant's research facilities and capabilities that will be
utilized. (emphasis added).65
The E-widget design discussed above is an example of the pre-
existing intangible situation in the first sentence. If the cost sharing
arrangement were moved back in time prior to the E-Widget break-
through, the terminology above could presumably require a buy-in
of the original idea for the E-widget design. At this level, it may be
difficult to ascertain any fair market value for the idea, but it would
be required from a theoretical standpoint.
63. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 841, supra note 23, at 11-638.
64. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(d)(4)(iii)(a)(3), 31 Fed. Reg. 10394 (1966).
65. White Paper, supra note 25, at 121.
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The White Paper's requirement of a buy-in of the going con-
cern value could open a Pandora's box. It might be a reasonable
requirement if the multinational group has a relatively small R & D
operation. However, it would essentially prohibit cost sharing for a
multinational with a very large R & D facility, because even a small
percentage of the "going concern" value would equate to a substan-
tial deduction for the participant, either the U.S. participant or the
foreign participant. The ABA comment makes this problem abun-
dantly clear:
There is no way that a foreign country will permit the subsidiary
of a U.S. parent company to deduct what is a potentialy enormous
tax-sheltering charge in such a situation. It is also highly likely
that the U.S. subsidiary of a foreign parent company would be
the subject of a serious and substantial challenge by its IRS exam-
ining agent if it attempted to shelter its US. taxable income for a
period of years with such a charge. (emphasis added). 66
The final buy-in discussion in the White Paper, basic research
not associated with any product, seems to fall neatly under the dis-
cussion of going concern with like arguments, and will not be dis-
cussed separately.
Character of the Cost Sharing Payment
The White Paper discusses the character of the cost sharing
payment. Since cost sharing is considered to be participation in the
ownership of the product, the payments are not treated as income to
a U.S. developer.6 7 The original payment of 100% of the expenses
incurred by the developer is considered a "loan" to the extent of the
participant's share. The participant's cost sharing payment is the
"repayment of the loan,"' 68 i.e. the participant's share of the ex-
pense. This payment will reduce the gross expenses of the devel-
oper to reflect only his share of the total costs incurred. Even
though only the net R & D expense is allowable as a deduction, and
the cost sharing payment is a non-income item to the developer, the
cost sharing payment may have other significant tax effects.
Where U.S. taxpayers are required to withhold tax at the
source of the payment, the White Paper indicates "no U.S. with-
holding tax would be imposed on outbound cost sharing payments
66. J. Fuller & R. Shea, supra note 46, at 17.
67. Since these payments are not income to the U.S. developer, they are obviously not
considered foreign source income. White Paper, supra note 22, at 124.
68. White Paper, supra note 25, at 123.
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made by a U.S. person to a foreign person."69
Where the taxpayer's foreign source income is important in de-
termining applicable foreign tax credits, only the net R & D expense
will be allocated between foreign source and U.S. source income.7"
This will generally result in a higher foreign tax credit to the U.S.
taxpayer.
The White Paper indicates that the R & D tax credit based on
100% of the R & D costs is properly attributed to the U.S. tax-
payer/developer, even if participating in a cost sharing arrange-
ment. It indicates that "[M]embers of a commonly controlled
group of corporations may disregard the intercompany reimburse-
ments for research expenditures."71 Even though the cost sharing
payment reduces the developer's expenses, § 41 allows the R & D
credit to the U.S. developer for the full amount of costs incurred in
the U.S.7 2. 73
The White Paper contains no discussion of the deductibility of
the buy-in. Since the buy-in is the purchase or license of an existing
product, an arm's length consideration which is "commensurate
with the income attributable to the intangible"'7 would be required.
This arm's length payment will conceivably retain the same charac-
ter as any other purchase or license of an asset.
SHARES IN THE BFCSA
A specific Congressional concern discussed in the § 482 White
Paper deals with the contributions each party will make to the
BFCSA and their derived benefit. Under the White Paper, the
shares in the venture should be based on several factors. The two
most important factors include the expected profit from the intangi-
ble and the geographic rights to be received on completion of the
project. These will be discussed below.
Expected Profit from the Intangible
The Committee Report states:
In order for cost-sharing arrangements to produce results consis-
tent with the changes made by the Act to royalty arrangements,
69. White Paper, supra note 25, at 123.
70. Treas. Regs. § 1.861-8 (1984).
71. White Paper, supra note 25, at 123-24.
72. See Prop. Treas. Regs. 1.44F-6(e) (1983). Also, although it cannot be cited as prece-
dent (I.R.C. § 61 10G)(3)), see Priv. Ltr. Rul. 86-43-006 (July 23, 1986).
73. White Paper, supra note 25, at 123.
74. I.R.C. §§ 367(d)(2), 482(1986).
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it is envisioned that the allocation of R & D cost-sharing arrange-
ments generally should be proportionate to profit as determined
before deduction for research and development. (emphasis
added).75
Although the Committee Report specifically states that the
cost allocation should be proportionate to profit, profits may be dif-
ficult to estimate. The 1966 proposed regulations were much more
flexible and indicated that "shares of the participating mem-
bers.. .[of a BFCSA] must be based upon a standard (such as com-
parative current sales or profits) which reflects changing
conditions."76 The proposed regulations also provided examples of
the shares computation using prior sales and estimated sales." The
§ 482 White Paper requires that the sharing of costs be proportion-
ate to profit, but does not preclude other methods where profits may
not be easy to estimate. "[I]n many cases, estimated units of pro-
duction may be an appropriate measure of benefit assuming that
there is a uniform unit of production .... If there is no uniform
unit of production, then sales value may be an appropriate mea-
sure .... "78 However, the White Paper makes it clear that neither
units of production, nor sales value is appropriate if it is "appar-
ent.. .that profitability differed substantially with respect to various
participants' rights."7 9
It is unclear how participants in a BFCSA will know at the
outset whether profitability will differ substantially from estimates.
The IRS, however, can easily compare these figures on audit. The
ABA comment indicates a concern over this language in the White
Paper as it "would offer examining agents the opportunity to dis-
qualify many cost sharing agreements."'80
The White Paper should not prohibit cost sharing arrangements
simply because an examining agent is able to show that gross or
net profit margins turned out to be different from what was ex-
pected and that therefore the cost sharing arrangement, which
may have been based on units of production or sales, is no longer
a valid cost sharing arrangement. (emphasis added).81
This should be a very real concern to companies currently par-
ticipating in, or expecting to participate in a BFCSA. When a cost
75. H.R. CONF- REP. No. 841, supra note 23, at 11-638.
76. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(d)(4), 31 Fed. Reg. 10394 (1966).
77. Id.
78. White Paper, supra note 25, at 119.
79. Id. at 120.
80. J. Fuller & R. Shea, supra note 46, at 14.
81. Id.
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sharing agreement is disqualified, everything developed to the date
of disqualification (i.e., the audit period) must be sold or licensed to
the "new" BFCSA at the then current fair market value. This fair
market value may be more or less than the R & D costs incurred to
date. A product that appears highly successful could have a fair
market value significantly higher than the incurred costs. The ex-
tent of this difference may make it prohibitive to buy it back into
the BFCSA.
Periodic evaluation (perhaps, an annual review) of the
BFCSA's methods for splitting up the shares and a review of the
underlying numbers should indicate a good faith effort at an appro-
priate reflection of income. The new regulations should be clear
that this is all that is required of the taxpayer to maintain the "bona
fides" of the arrangement and to stave off disqualification.
Assignment of Exclusive Geographic Rights
In determining each party's contribution to the costs of the
BFCSA, the § 482 White Paper requires the "[a]ssignment of exclu-
sive geographic rights." Within that titled section, the IRS states
"[w]hile it is difficult under the best of circumstances to predict
what benefits each of the participants will derive, it is virtually im-
possible to do so unless the participants are assigned specific exclu-
sive geographic rights to intangibles developed under the
arrangement.",82 Unlimited exploitation rights (undivided rights) to
each member could cause numerous problems on a disposition of
the asset in that it may be difficult to determine the benefits derived
on the sale by the participating member. Exclusive geographic
rights would certainly make for a simpler audit. The ABA com-
ment suggests that this requirement may be contrary to current
business practice and will unnecessarily restrict business
flexibility.83
Assignment of U.S. Geographic Rights
As to U.S. geographic rights in the intangible produced, the
White Paper states that:
U.S. geographic rights should never be permitted to be assigned
under a cost sharing arrangement to a foreign person if either:
(1) the participants are part of a U.S. owned multinational group;
(2) a significant portion of the research is performed in the
82. White Paper, supra note 25, at 117.
83. J. Fuller & R. Shea, supra note 46, at 6.
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United States; or (3) any U.S. person participates in the
arrangement.84
The White Paper goes on to describe the only kind of foreign
person who could hold U.S. rights would be "a foreign-owned mul-
tinational group that conducts the research overseas and does not
include any U.S. affiliates as a participant in the arrangement."85
The White Paper says that this prohibition is consistent with long-
standing § 367(a) policy.8 6 The ABA comment indicates the belief
that this is incorrect, and it goes on to state:
The issue under § 367(a) involves separating the research deduc-
tion from the income producing intangible developed by that re-
search effort. Cost sharing is completely different. The cost and
risk of developing an intangible under a cost sharing arrange-
ment are borne in direct proportion to the expected benefit. 87
The ABA comment also gives examples which make the White
Paper prohibition on assignment of U.S. geographic rights to a for-
eign person somewhat illogical.
The fact that significant research is performed at a U.S. univer-
sity pursuant to funding provided by a foreign parent com-
pany. . .should not subject the foreign parent company to a
requirement that U.S. geographic rights must be owned by its
U.S. subsidiary, or that it must incorporate a U.S. subsidiary to
own those rights. Further, the fact that "any U.S. person" par-
ticipates in the arrangement, such as a U.S. citizen in a foreign
country, should not serve as a prohibition against having the for-
eign parent company own the developments of the research
which it has funded. 8
There are obviously some significant glitches in the White Pa-
per if a literal reading of its terms produce examples so unfair to a
foreign parent company with U.S. subsidiaries.
No Safe Harbors
The previous discussion on apportionment of the BFCSA
shares based on estimated profits and geographical rights may leave
the taxpayer uncertain as to the practicality of cost sharing in their
particular situation. In fact, tax practitioners have indicated that it
is unrealistic to expect taxpayers to estimate gross or net profit mar-
84. White Paper, supra note 25, at 117.
85. Id. at 117-18.
86. Id. at 117.
87. J. Fuller & R. Shea, supra note 46, at 7-8.
88. Id.
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gins from estimated sales.89 Allowing the taxpayer a safe harbor
would provide limited certainty for the future. The White Paper
blatantly rejects safe harbors and states that "[o]ne of the most con-
sistent criticisms of the section 482 regulations is that they do not
provide taxpayers with enough certainty to establish intercompany
prices that will satisfy the Service without overpaying taxes."9 The
White Paper then goes through a lengthy explanation of their objec-
tions to safe harbor provisions and concludes that "[h]istorical ex-
perience with safe harbors indicates that they generally result in
unwarranted windfalls for taxpayers without significant benefits for
the government." 91
Periodic Adjustments
In order to reflect income which is "commensurate with the
income attributable to the intangible,"'92 the parties must have some
mechanism to periodically review the actual income generated by
the intangible. The House report details the necessary adjustments:
[T]he committee intends to require that the payments made for
the intangible be adjusted over time to reflect changes in the in-
come attributable to the intangible. The bill is not intended to
require annual adjustments when there are only minor variations
in revenues. However, it will not be sufficient to consider only
the evidence of value at the time of the transfer. Adjustments
will be required when there are major variations in the annual
amounts of revenue attributable to the intangible. (emphasis
added).93
On first glance, this seems like a reasonable approach. But, in
order to assess whether an adjustment is required, the company
must make an annual review of the profitability of the intangible.
The White Paper discusses periodic adjustments in the context of
transfer prices, but since the "commensurate with income" stan-
dard apples to BFCSAs, the discussion should also apply to cost
sharing:
[Taxpayers should review transfer pricing arrangements relating
to intangibles (especially high profit intangibles) as often as neces-
'sary to assure that their transfer prices are consistent with substan-
tial changes in intangible income that may have occurred since
89. See comments by Marianne Burge in International Taxes, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA),
Oct. 31, 1988, at G-2.
90. White Paper, supra note 25, at 73.
91. Id. at 78.
92. I.R.C. § 482 (1986). For the complete text of § 482, see supra note 11.
93. H.R. Rep. No 426, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 425-26 (1985).
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the inception of the. . .arrangements. For industries that un-
dergo rapid technological change.. .this standard may dictate an-
nual review. (emphasis added).9 4
Both the House Report and the White Paper seem to indicate
that adjustments may be necessary annually, but certainly not more
frequently. Thus, an annual review may assure that corporation
that there are no substantial changes in intangible income from the
amounts originally estimated, or as previously revised.
AGREEMENT TERMS AND CONDITIONS
It is crucial that the cost sharing agreement be in writing95 and
complete as to conditions, terms, and general provisions. A poorly
written cost sharing agreement may be the instrument by which the
court finds the entire arrangement a sham and ignores its exist-
ence.96 A well-written agreement which is not followed by the cor-
poration could also negate the BFCSA. This would allow the IRS
to invalidate the BFCSA and require a buy-in of the existing tech-
nology at then current fair market value.
Although a BFCSA may be an arrangement between related
parties, the transaction should be set up to "look" arm's length. In
setting up the agreement, the parties may wish to document signifi-
cant factors which would alter the terms of an arm's length dealing.
The agreement, among other things, should include a state-
ment of the parties' good faith effort to bear their respective shares
of all the costs and risks of development on an arm's length basis.9 7
It should include each member's understanding of the risk that no
intangible property may be produced98 or that any intangible prop-
erty produced will be of insufficient value to recover cost.
The agreement should specifically describe, inter alia, the par-
ties' intent to enter into a cost sharing arrangement, the R & D
project(s) undertaken, the nature and extent of the interest of each
participating member (e.g., exclusive rights to a particular geo-
graphic territory), the method for determining each participant's
cost allocation (i.e., the percentage of costs to be allocated to that
party) and the risks and benefits to be shared in the event that cir-
94. White Paper, supra note 25, at 66.
95. The BFCSA must be in writing pursuant to Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(d)(4) (1968).
96. A cost sharing arrangement which is determined to be a sham (i.e. NOT bona fide)
could be invalidated on audit. This may require the parties to buy-in to the existing
developments.
97. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(d)(4) (1968).
98. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(d)(4)(ii)(b), 31 Fed. Reg. 10394 (1966).
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cumstances change.99 Rights granted under the agreement should
be perpetual except for specific unanticipated events like bank-
ruptcy, expropriation, or departure from the controlled group."
Further, to establish the arm's length nature of the arrange-
ment and the good faith of the participating parties, the agreement
may provide for the creation of a review committee comprised of
one or more representatives of each participating member of the
BFCSA.' 01 The committee's duties should be clearly prescribed in
the agreement and should include provisions for an annual review.
At a minimum, the periodic review should encompass a review of
the costs included in the R & D pool, the computation of costs allo-
cated to each member, the progress of the R & D venture, and the
plans for completion. It should also compute adjustments for major
variations in the profitability of the intangible.
Duration of the Arrangement
The written agreement should contain a provision regarding
the duration of the arrangement. In some instances, the parties
may wish to maintain the BFCSA indefinitely to cover the costs of
technological improvements.
Grandfathering Provisions
The § 482 White Paper suggests that some sort of grandfather-
ing provision would be appropriate:
One possibility would be to permit any cost sharing agreement
that conforms to the existing regulations, and that has been in
existence for more than 5 years prior to 1987, to be recognized
fully if conformed within a certain period after the promulgation
of the new rules .... If the cost sharing agreement has been in
effect for less than 5 years and the agreement does not conform
substantially to the new rules, the old agreement would not be
recognized. 10 2
What is the possible motive for placing the five-year require-
ment on the grandfathering provisions? If the agreement conforms
99. See generally, Tech. Adv. Mem. 77-04-079-940A (Apr. 7, 1977). Caveat: A cost-
sharing arrangement which would otherwise qualify as bona fide may fail to so qualify where
the parties to the arrangement share costs on a substantially different basis than the one
provided for in the agreement. Prop. Treas. Regs. § 1.482-2(d)(1)(ii)(a), 31 Fed. Reg. 10394
(1966).
100. Comments by the Committee on Foreign Activities of U.S. Taxpayers of the Tax
Section of the American Bar Association, Section IV [hereinafter "Comments"].
101. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-11-103 (Dec. 18, 1980).
102. White Paper, supra note 25, at 126.
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to the existing regulations and is fully conformed to any new rules
within a certain period, then it should be allowed. Obviously, the
five-year requirement would serve to invalidate numerous cost
sharing arrangements, and require the buy-in of the existing tech-
nology. This buy-in could have a drastic tax effect on the U.S. de-
veloper. The ABA comment, also, urges deletion of the five-year
requirement. 103
Administrative Requirements
The § 482 White Paper suggests that taxpayers participating in
a BFCSA be required to make a formal election, document the spe-
cifics of the agreement, and file a copy of the agreement with the
first tax return filed subsequent to the effective date of the agree-
ment. 1" The IRS would also require the taxpayer to agree to pro-
duce "in English and in the United States, the records of foreign
participants necessary to verify the computation and appropriate-
ness of the respective cost shares within sixty days of a request by
the Service." 105
BFCSA ILLUSTRATIONS
The following will illustrate the mechanics of several BFCSAs.
Since the future of the regulations is still mere speculation, these
illustrations may or may not meet the necessary requirements for a
BFCSA in regulations as adopted. 0 6
The illustrations will involve a U.S. developer performing the
R & D in the U.S. and its foreign wholly-owned subsidiary partici-
pating in the R & D through a BFCSA.107 Each participant plans
to manufacture a product using the intangible, and subsequently sell
such product. Each participant will become the owner of exclusive
rights to market in a specified geographic territory. 108
In order to have a successful BFCSA, the arrangement must be
103. J. Fuller & R. Shea, supra note 46, at 22. For tax purposes, a change in accounting
method requires the prior approval of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. The ABA
comment recommends that the regulations indicate that a conforming modification to an
existing BFCSA does not constitute a change in method of accounting.
104. White Paper, supra note 25, at 125.
105. Id. at 105-106.
106. The White Paper is merely a study and discussion of the possibilities for future
regulations.
107. As discussed above, the super-royalty provisions apply equally to inbound technol-
ogy and outbound technology. If the R & D is being carried on in the foreign country and
the U.S. participant is making the payments, the concerns will generally be reversed.
108. Cost contributions must be commensurate with the benefits to be received from the
BFCSA. Thus the benefits must be measurable rights. Unlimited exploitation rights (undi-
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workable from a corporate standpoint. The corporation must be
able to provide books and records which contain the required infor-
mation. This will include records like the general ledger, manage-
ment reports, and cost center breakdown with the R & D group
accounted for separately. The corporation must also have the abil-
ity to break down the R & D further into specific projects.
THEORETICAL BFCSA POSSIBILITIES
There may be several mechanical methods that would conceiv-
ably meet the requirements of a BFCSA. The following discussion
will provide some basic illustrations on how to estimate each party's
share of the costs and rights to the developed product. The first
three examples allocate profits based on a prediction of the future.
Each one uses a different measuring stick, i.e. profits, units of pro-
duction or gross sales. The fourth example provides an estimate of
future profits, units of production or gross sales based on past expe-
rience for a three-year moving average. The fifth and sixth exam-
ples illustrate non-traditional BFCSAs and the final example
illustrates the buy-in situation discussed previously.
Future Actual Profits
A cost sharing method based on future actual profits will util-
ize an ever-changing prediction of future profits attributable to the
intangible. The estimated future profits by location are used to de-
termine the applicable percentage of costs to be borne by each par-
ticipant. This allocation percentage is used to allocate the R & D
pool between the parties.
Mechanically, start with an estimate of profits from the intan-
gible, split between the U.S. parent and the foreign subsidiary. Di-
vide foreign profits by worldwide profits. The resulting percentage
is multiplied by the R & D pool (all includible costs) for Year One
and the result is the cost sharing payment of the foreign participant
in Year One. An example of the computation may provide clearer
understanding:
vided rights) to each member could cause numerous problems on a disposition, or sale of the
asset. It could also be a vehicle for avoiding recognition of the profits in the U.S. developer.
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Estimated U.S.
/ Profits from the
Intangible (A%)
Estimated
Worldwide Profits
from the Intangible
(A+B=O0%)
Estimated Foreign
Profits from the
Intangible (B%)
R & D Pool X B% Foreign contribution
for Year One to U.S. Developer in
Year One
In Year Two, the profit percentage is re-computed based on more
accurate figures (hopefully) and the resulting percentage is multi-
plied by the R & D pool for Year Two. Year Two's cost sharing
payment PLUS the adjustment for Year One (using the more accu-
rate percentage) will be the total cost sharing payment of the for-
eign participant.109 This will alter the allocation percentage both
prospectively and retrospectively for the number of years covered in
the agreement.
This method falls neatly within the "commensurate with in-
come" language of the Committee reports.110 It utilizes the best
information available at the time the agreement is negotiated, and is
adjusted annually to reflect actual profit experience. This alterna-
tive is obviously more work for the corporation than a one-time
arm's length approach as it requires yearly evaluation and, possibly,
adjustment. However, it seems far from impracticable. If the com-
pany gathered good estimates up front, then they should be able to
gather the information based on actuals.
Determining the profits attributable to the intangible, however,
may not be that clear-cut. The actual profits may vary due to man-
ufacturing efficiencies, marketing tactics, translation rates, local
competition, etc., rather than as a direct result of the intangible.
Breaking out only those profits directly related to the intangible
109. It is unclear whether a Year One adjustment could be added to the Year Two pay-
ment as shown in the example, or whether an amended return would be required. A prospec-
tive adjustment would be favorable as the information was unavailable in the earlier year and
amended return requirements would add administrative hassle to what could be a relatively
simple procedure in the later year.
110. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 841, supra note 23, at 11-637.
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may be very difficult, and could be the source of much litigation
over the bona fides of the BFCSA. 111
From the taxpayer standpoint, a moving estimate seems to take
the pressure off a single year's estimate. The information is ana-
lyzed and appropriate entries and payments are made taking a "best
shot" approach. If the cost allocation is high, it can be adjusted
down in the following year, if low it can be adjusted up in the fol-
lowing year. It appears neutral from an IRS standpoint as they still
have the capacity to make future audit adjustments if they disagree
with the allocation method and have lost nothing in the outcome,
and it puts the burden on the taxpayer to perform an annual
evaluation.
Units of Production
Another alternative is to base the cost sharing payment on esti-
mated units of production to be allocated to the parties. This
method may provide a clearer reflection of income attributable to
the intangible. "Presumably, the value of technology is best mea-
sured by the proportionate usage of such technology and not by the
relative profitability of each party which would be influenced by
other factors .... "112
Mechanically, start with an estimate of total units of produc-
tion split between the foreign subsidiary and the U.S. parent. Di-
vide foreign units by worldwide units. The resulting percentage is
multiplied by the R & D pool for Year One, the result is the cost
sharing payment of the foreign participant in Year One. In Year
Two, the profit percentage is re-computed. This continues as dis-
cussed above under Future Actual Profits to retroactively alter the
percentage over the number of years provided in the BFCSA.
Although the conferees "[e]nvisioned that the allocation of R
& D cost sharing arrangements generally should be proportionate
to profit as determined before deduction for research and develop-
ment,"' 13 the wording appears suggestive rather than proscriptive.
It would appear that an allocation not proportionate to profits
would be allowed as long as they are "consistent with the changes
made by the Act to royalty arrangements."
'1 14
As discussed above, this approach also requires yearly evalua-
111. Regarding the effect of disqualification based on the bona fides of the plan, see supra
text accompanying notes 63-66 regarding Buy-in.&
112. Comments, supra note 98.
113. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 841, supra note 23, at H-638.
114. Id.
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tion and, possibly, adjustment. It requires up-front source informa-
tion for production estimates and an R & D cost summary.
This alternative measures usage of the technology in the manu-
facturing process which reflects real use of the intangible, and ig-
nores profits which may be influenced by factors such as translation
rates, or manufacturing and marketing efficiencies. The White Pa-
per makes it clear that units of production will be inappropriate if it
is "apparent.. .that profitability differed substantially with respect
to various participants' rights." 115 Thus, although units of pro-
duction may be an excellent gauge of the use of the intangible, un-
less it can be converted to a profitability number, the IRS may
attempt to disqualify the cost sharing arrangement.
Gross Sales
The gross sales method was suggested as an example of cost
sharing in the 1966 proposed regulations. Mechanically, it is the
same as the previous two examples, using a different measuring
stick. As with Units of Production, it will be inappropriate to use
sales if it is "apparent.. .that profitability differed substantially with
respect to various participants' rights."' 16
Moving Average Using Prior Profits, Units or Sales
Using the three examples discussed above, the taxpayer may
have some difficulty determining its first year estimate for a new
product. It may be feasible to use prior experience in ventures in-
volving the same participants in like arrangements. As some years
may be better than others, or some products better than others, one
year may not provide a very good basis for estimation. A three-year
or five-year average of profits, units or sales may be more appropri-
ate and could be adjusted annually for that year's experience.
This moving average could eliminate the gamble based on sales
or profit projections for a particular year's cost sharing computa-
tion. However, these estimates may be no better in actuality than
the one-time profit projections discussed above.
Reciprocal BFCSAs
Similar to a cross-licensing agreement, the parties may set up
mutual BFCSA's evaluated annually to determine the net costs of
115. White Paper, supra note 25, at 120.
116. Id.
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the technology. 17 The excess value multiplied by the percentage of
ownership should be paid by the party developing the product with
the lesser value. The best way to demonstrate the mechanics of this
type of BFCSA is by example.
Example 1: Party X has accrued $5 million in R & D cost at
the end of Year One on Product A, Party Y has accrued $7 million
in cost on Product B. Assuming each party will own a 50% share
of each product on completion, party X is required to pay $1 mil-
lion ($2 million difference in R & D pools, multiplied by X's 50%
share) to Party Y.
Example 2: Same as in Example 1 except that Party X will
own a 10% share in each technology on completion. Costs accrued
to date on both projects equal $12 million. X is responsible for $1.2
million ($12 million multiplied by 10%), but has accrued $5 million
of cost. Therefore, Y's cost sharing payment to X in Year One is
$3.8 million ($5.0 million less $1.2 million).
Example 3: Same as in Example 2 except that in Year Two,
the allocation percentage is changed and it is determined that Party
X will own a 15% share in each technology on completion. Costs
accrued to date on both projects equal $20 million. X's total share
over the two years is $3 million ($20 million multiplied by 15%). X
will be responsible for $1.8 million for Year Two ($3 million less
$1.2 million-amount paid in year One).
Reciprocal BFCSAs have the same requirements as the previ-
ous three illustrations of BFCSAs, except that the information is
required for both parties. This may appear to be double the admin-
istrative work. Eventually, though, each of these developers would
have to account for the transfer of the technology at a conceivably
higher price.
Advance Payment Adjusted by Profits
Similar to an advance royalty on the sale of a book, the foreign
participant makes a lump-sum payment to the developer up front
with an annual adjustment for the actual allocation percentage as
discussed in the above illustrations. Each party contributes to the
economic activity from inception. As opposed to the other pos-
117. A cross-licensing agreement (or a reciprocal license) may be used where corpora-
tions own valuable technology that they want to make available to each other. Essentially it
is a swap in that there is no net tansfer of technology between the parties, or a net transfer for
the difference in value of the technology. This type of license can be useful in developing
product enhancements by both members, or in viewing the other part's manufacturing line.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(d)(2) (1968).
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sibilities, the foreign participant puts his cash' at risk up front
rather than at year-end when the cost-sharing payment is calcu-
lated. This method, therefore, equalizes the respective economic
risk at the front end. Otherwise, it is identical to other possibilities
discussed earlier.
Buy-in to Base Technology; Cost Share the Enhancements
For a BFCSA utilizing the existing technology of one of the
participants, a buy-in will likely be required. 119 The buy-in could be
either a direct purchase of the intangible for a lump sum amount or
a licensing of the existing technology, both of which are subject to
the § 482 regulations under the 1986 Tax Reform Act. For a high-
technology product that becomes quickly obsolete, it may be appro-
priate to set a declining royalty payment over the remaining life of
the asset. The BFCSA on the enhancements will necessarily in-
clude the illustrations previously discussed.
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
It is important to assess the future R & D "product" before
entering blindly into a BFCSA. Although it may be difficult to pre-
dict up front, the BFCSA will probably work to corporate advan-
tage where the technology is expected to be very sophisticated,
highly proprietary, and highly profitable, that is, where the royal-
ties would keep increasing over its useful life.
A licensing arrangement, on the other hand, may be less ex-
pensive in the long run under circumstances in which the technol-
ogy is easily duplicated, much of the value is derived from
components purchased from outside vendors, the foreign country
has limited protection against piracy, or differences in the manufac-
turing line or selling strengths of the foreign subsidiary contribute
to foreign profits.
CONCLUSION
In the realm of the super-royalty provisions, cost-sharing re-
mains an impressive exception. Taxpayers are looking for relief
from the uncertainty behind the new and frightening super-royalty
provisions and their possible detrimental future effects. BFCSAs
118. There appears to be no requirement that an actual cash transfer take place. The
parties will probably reflect the payments by appropriate intercompany accounting entries.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 64-67 regarding Buy-ins.
[Vol. 5
1989] COST SHARING 161
are here to stay, but may be significantly curtailed by future § 482
regulations.
It is imperative that the corporate developer assess its intended
product, its manufacturing and marketing plans, and the product's
estimated profitability before deciding on the form of "transfer."
Management should be informed of the various tax alternatives for
the intended transfer or co-ownership of technology and the conse-
quences of each.
It is only in this enlightened state that corporate management
can make the decision on whether to set up a BFCSA or some alter-
native method of transfer with some certainty as to future tax effect.

